


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January 7, 1981

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REVIEWED by _____ DATE 6/1/84

TO: The Secretary

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THROUGH: P - Mr. Newsom

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FROM: NEA - Harold Saunders

() DENY () Non-responsive info.

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SUBJECT: UN Special Representative for Afghanistan

This memorandum provides an analysis of why the Soviets and the DRA have dropped their opposition to appointment by Waldheim of a Special Representative for Afghanistan. We have also examined Pakistan's motives and intentions. Finally, we have outlined a strategy for responding to these developments in the UN, with Pakistan, our allies and others.

The Situation

Pakistan Foreign Minister Agha Shahi informed our Ambassador on January 4 that he has written the UN Secretary General requesting him to appoint a special representative "in order to promote, under the Secretary General's aegis and presence or in the presence of his special representative, a dialogue between the representatives of Pakistan and Iran and the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, with a view to bringing about a political solution of the Afghan crisis."

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The Soviets and Afghans have, by implication, associated themselves with the November 20 UNGA resolution on Afghanistan by indicating a willingness to have Waldheim appoint a Special Representative as called for in that resolution. The Pakistanis appear to be gratified that the other side has expressed "understanding" of their position that the Afghans would participate in any talks on a party, rather than a governmental, basis. The Pakistanis can argue that this is consistent with the Islamic Conference position that talks among the parties should not imply any recognition of the Babrak regime. Nevertheless, if no representatives of the Afghan nationalists take part, the stature of the DRA will de facto be enhanced.

Shahi's message to the Secretary General gives some indication of what the Pakistanis may have done to make a deal possible, namely agreement to a dialogue between the representatives of Pakistan and Iran and the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan under UN auspices. Shahi's formulation is at odds with the GA resolution which does not limit the role of the Special Representative to promoting a regional dialogue. The formulation is, however, consistent with Babrak's May 14 proposal (except for the status of the Afghan representation) and with the Soviet insistence that working out regional arrangements for non-interference take precedence over discussion of Soviet troop withdrawals. Association of the United Nations with these talks would be an added advantage for the Soviet/Afghan side.

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